mute objects as actors to the empirical, large-scale organizational computing domain. The article therefore proposes a new way through which to examine the problem of organizational computing. The article is focused on public organizations, yet its conclusions are equally applicable to large private sector organizations. Second, the study proposes that public administration students must learn about the tough computing trade-offs between data and meaning, learning and forgetting, short-term efficiency and long-term red tape. Finally, the study aspires to sensitize decision makers about the hidden red tape costs of expensive computer modernization programs.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Scholars have developed two different definitions of the term red tape. Kaufman (1977) proposed that the rules people find frustrating are nonetheless beneficial because they ensure accountability, preserve rights of procedure, or provide protection from abuse of power (pp. 3-4, 29-30) . Bozeman (2000) developed the second definition, the one that is used in this article. Here, the term red tape refers to "rules, regulations, procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve" (Bozeman, 2000, p. 12) .
Many scholars are cautiously optimistic about computers' potential to streamline governmental red tape (Bekkers & Zouridis, 1999, pp. 185-186; Bellamy & Taylor, 1997 /1998 Carroll & Lynn, 1996, pp. 301-302; Durst & Newell, 1999, p. 66; Hood, 1991, p. 3; Kamensky, 1994, p. 249; Kaufman, 1977, p. 99; Muid, 1994, p. 123; Pape & Thoresen, 1992; Snellen, 1994, p. 302; Thompson, 1999; Wright, 1994, p. 106) . But the evidence to support this optimism is inconclusive at best. In the private sector, scholars recently began warning managers against overprogramming their organization with computers (Boudreau & Robey, 1996) . In the public sector, too, scholars noted that technology has often failed to cut red tape in a meaningful way (Frederickson, 1996, p. 264; Gill, 1995; Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997; Kraemer & King, 1986; Mascarenhas, 1993, p. 324; Northrop, Kraemer, Dunkle, & King, 1990; Peters & Savoie, 1996, p. 285; Quindlen, 1992) .
This study argues that computers are actors rather than tools and therefore often increase, rather than decrease, red tape. According to this line of argument, the modern organization contains numerous human-nonhuman collectives that cannot be partitioned along the lines of their animated social and mute technical properties (Latour, 1993, pp. 49-50) . Inside such a human-nonhuman collective, sometimes mute objects such as computers pilot relations between humans (Latour, 1999, p. 183) . With time, organizations mound new human-nonhuman collectives on top of older collectives. The section below titled "Mounding: How Do Electronic Mounds Evolve?" demonstrates how disparate computer systems in public organizations grow to acquire a life of their own.
Inside the electronic mound, humans and nonhumans gradually coevolve and inscribe their properties onto each other. The mutual transactions between human and nonhuman actors are so numerous, intimate, and complex that some of them must be "black-boxed." Numerous persons, customs, protocols, and institutions are required for the creation of a single black box such as a computer system. Black boxes are pliable and durable and last far longer than the relations that fabricated them. They sit among us in silence, as if they did not exist, invisible, transparent, and mute. People only notice them when they break, and legions of human and nonhuman actors materialize to fix them (Latour, 1999, p. 185) . The section below titled "Black-boxing: What Do Electronic Mounds Know?" explains why and how generations of bureaucrats incrementally and over a long period inscribe an ever-increasing volume of data, rules, and exceptions to the rule into computer systems. These systems then become mission-critical black boxes that are hard to retire.
Technical specialists serve as the voices of black boxes. These specialists are indispensable to the organization but occupy relatively obscure and inferior positions in its job hierarchy. Specialists cannot attend to the needs of so many black boxes and therefore they search-and find-the obligatory passage points, those few places through which all human-nonhuman transactions are mediated (Latour, organizations to design an overall information systems architecture (GAO, 1997a) . But, assuming that government employees are smart and hardworking people, then why are so many of them creating poor information systems? Instead of criticizing such systems, this study empathizes with the electronic mounds that large governmental agencies have created over the past 40 years. It also pays close attention to the agencies'responses to the GAO reports and to their internal computer manuals.
Second, the article uses findings from an extensive 3-year field research on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) projects in the Israeli public sector. In this project, 80 Public Management Information Systems (PMIS) directors and users of public ICT systems were interviewed. The interviewees described how new senior public sector managers from all departments (i.e., legal, accounting, logistics, etc.) frequently come to the PMIS department to "learn the job." At first, this phenomenon appeared inexplicable; for example, why does a new director of the legal department in the Ministry of Transportation choose to spend his or her first month on the job in the offices of the PMIS department? Further investigation gave birth to the arguments below on the emergence of a new class of infocrats. Finally, the article uses ICT-in-government case study reports that were published since 1990 in other countries. These reports provide some interesting evidence on themes such as the emergence of new electronic red tape.
MOUNDING: HOW DO ELECTRONIC MOUNDS EVOLVE?
Computer systems rarely retire. For example, Keil (1995) narrates the history of a computer system in a large, private sector corporation that drove sales representatives and customers to madness. Still, only the unusual combination of the abrupt death of the system's champion and mounting sales losses finally convinced managers to retire it. Such systems govern the lives of large public agencies. For example, the IRS maintains its two most critical databases on aging mainframe systems. Programmers can only access these databases using the archaic Assembler computer language. To change a single character in a single program, programmers must reprogram every subsequent character. Yet, this unwieldy system will not retire because newer systems cannot execute all the mission-critical tasks of the old system. The IRS built a more modern taxpayer notice system (dubbed CORRESPONDEX) but failed to merge large quantities of old mainframe data into taxpayer notices. Programmers were then asked to develop new Assembler programs so CORRESPONDEX could acquire the data it needed from the old mainframes (GAO, 1994a) . Today, IRS letter technicians must consult seven different manuals to maintain CORRESPONDEX. One of these manuals declares that the manufacturer of the old mainframe-based text editor no longer supports it and therefore "one day, it (i.e., the old letter-generating software) will no longer work correctly." Hence, the IRS manual explains, "The instructions for the use of the Text Editor will continue to appear in this handbook but will not be updated" (IRS, 2000a) . Internal computer manuals often tell the story of mission-critical systems that cannot retire even though they are no longer supported by their vendors.
Sometimes, organizations cannot eliminate even a single data element in an old system. For example, the GAO proposed to use Social Security Numbers (SSNs) instead of the IRS-generated Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) to match data about Sole Proprietors.
1 IRS officials responded that there were about 23 million pairs of EINs and SSNs that shared the same sequence of digits. IRS officials added that this change would require a "massive reconfiguration" of databases as well as "extensive reprogramming" efforts in the IRS, Social Security Administration (SSA), and private sector record systems (GAO, 1995) . If public agencies cannot delete a single data element, how will they retire a mission-critical computer system? Even paper-based systems sometimes refuse to retire. For example, the FAA decided to retain its "existing paper flight-strip technology" because, according to the agency, "electronic strips were too technically challenging and costly to develop" (GAO, 1998b) . Aging computer systems are even less likely to be put out to pasture. Commonly, public organizations prefer to retain rather than tamper with old software. For example, the U.S. Air Force decided to double the memory of the 1970s vintage computer systems aboard its B-1B bombers instead of spending more money to replace the aging systems. The Air Force knew that this simple memory upgrade was insufficient to support all of its goals. However, the Air Force did not wish to change the poorly documented and extensively patched software code aboard the planes (GAO, 1996a) . Likewise, the IRS piloted its main Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) in July 1969 and upgraded the system several times since then. Each upgrade extended the life of the IDRS's archaic software code by executing it on stronger hardware. The IDRS system accumulated numerous types of forms throughout the years including the following:
• Form 5391, to report on a nonemergency problem;
• Form 5715, to report on an emergency problem;
• Forms 1938 and 6294, to suggest changes to forms and letters relating to the IDRS system; • Treasury Form 64-50.1, to submit ideas on how to improve processing procedures; • The Editorial Change Request Form, to suggest changes "to the manner in which a procedure is presented without a change to the procedure being described" (IRS, 2000b) .
As this example illustrates, maintaining numerous old computer systems has become a major source of new governmental red tape. New information systems frequently extend the life of older systems. Consider, for example, the case of the DOD's Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS), which supports a wide range of personnel management functions such as benefits administration. In 1995, DOD decided to replace DCPDS because the system required duplicate data entry, relied on outdated technology, was expensive to maintain, and difficult to change or access. However, by 1995, generations of 418 ARPA / December 2001 bureaucrats had already embedded unique data-processing routines in DCPDS. For example, DCPDS alone knew how to pay the salaries of DOD foreign national employees who were not entitled to the same benefits as American employees. After spending $300 million on a replacement project, DOD decided to "regionalize" the new information system. Twenty-two regional DOD centers received the new system and built new functionality into it, but DOD retained its ancient DCPDS for other personnel operations (GAO, 1999b) .
The DCPDS story exemplifies how organizations accumulate electronic mounds consisting of aging systems that live on because they provide critical functionality that newer systems cannot provide. In another example, the FAA launched two ambitious projects to replace the present, ground-based navigation and landing system with a satellite-based system that uses signals generated by DOD's Global Positioning System (GPS). The two new systems provided major new benefits such as improved precision-landing capabilities. Regrettably, GPS provided low-power signals that were susceptible to radio frequency interference even by individuals. To complicate matters further, only in 2010 would a sufficient number of satellites be in orbit to support the new systems. In the meantime, U.S. domestic air travel has grown significantly (GAO, 1997b; Holstein, Lavelle, & Mulrine, 2000, pp. 32, 38) . Hence, the FAA must continue developing both the old and the new navigation and landing systems.
The electronic mound becomes more complex when its genealogical systems borrow data from each other. The FAA began computerizing its operations in the 1950s and today its "computer Tower of Babel" contains numerous computing layers. The 54 operational Air Tower Control (ATC) systems have been written in 53 different programming languages, of which 19 are obsolete versions of the Assembler programming language. The FAA's 23 en route centers rely on more than 50 different systems to perform information processing as well as display, navigation, surveillance, communications, and weather functions. Not surprisingly, the FAA's 30-year-old, centerpiece Host Computer System (HCS) cannot communicate with these systems. So, the FAA built an "interim" system to convert other systems' feeds into data formats and communications protocols that HCS understands. Later on, the FAA added yet another minisystem to help two other systems to converse (GAO, 1997b) . In early 2000, the FAA announced the largest of these two interim systems had already exceeded its life expectancy and began constructing yet another interim system (http://www.faa.gov/ia/iaeunomia.htm, July 5, 2000). In exactly the same manner, the NWS piled its modern satellite-based systems on top of a 1970s information processing, display, and data communications system that was built on top of a 1950s radar equipment system (GAO, 1997c) .
Electronic mounds rarely collapse because organizations such as the FAA deliberately embed redundant, duplicate, and backup systems in these mounds (Landau, 1969) . However, the tasks of maintaining and operating the electronic mound consume increasingly large amounts of financial and human resources. For example, poor data in the electronic mound of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) resulted in poor financial reports about insured loans valued at more than $1 trillion. After the savings and loans debacle, HUD officials estimated in 1993 that it would take them 5 years to merely document the data in their electronic mound (GAO, 1994b) .
Over time, the organization's electronic mound begins to depend on data feeds from the electronic mounds of other organizations. For example, the DOD's electronic mound (10,000 computer networks, 28,000 information systems, and 1.5 million computers) exchanges data with the SSA's electronic mound (300 large, mission-critical computer systems), the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA), and the Treasury. The Treasury and VA's electronic mounds then interface with various private sector institutions to issue benefit checks (GAO, 1998c (GAO, , 1999c (GAO, , 1999d .
Ironically, the electronic mound grows stronger when the organization modernizes its computer systems. The requirements for a decadelong computer modernization program must be stabilized early on to ensure its success. To meet pressing needs, bureaucrats are then compelled to inscribe interim solutions onto older computer systems. It then becomes even harder to retire old systems. For example, the GAO pressed the IRS to track its mail and phone communications history vis-à-vis individual taxpayers. However, in 1998, IRS officials were executing a computer modernization program whose requirements had been defined in 1995. Relenting to GAO pressure, IRS officials began tracking taxpayer communications inside a small Quality Review Database (QRDB) system that the agency had been using to review the quality of staff responses in serving taxpayers. By doing so, IRS officials raised the odds that QRDB will never retire because this old system was given a 7-year lead time over the planned modern system to learn by trial and error how to capture taxpayer communications effectively (GAO, 2000a) . IRS officials today publish "modernization directives" and "legacy directives" related to 1960s and 1970s systems (IRS, 1999) . Likewise, in the mid-1990s, FAA officials could no longer wait for the completion of their ongoing, 15-year computer modernization program. They developed four interim projects and transferred existing software from obsolete display channel computers to newer computers at five en route centers (Badford, 1999; GAO, 1998d) .
Management fads also inscribe new computing layers onto the electronic mound. For example, at the height of the Total Quality Management (TQM) craze, the IRS established numerous Quality Improvement Project (QIP) teams. A new Quality Information System (QIS) was then built so the new Joint Quality Council could track the progress of QIP teams. When the TQM movement lost momentum, the IRS dispersed its QIP teams, but QIS remained inscribed in the electronic mound (Mani, 1995, p. 156) . Indeed, the effort to uproot QIS from this electronic mound is likely to cost more than the system's initial development because programmers will have to research, find, and resolve all the data-exchange routines that QIS maintains vis-à-vis other systems. In a similar manner, the construction of a new computer-related position in the organization often results in the generation of new types of red tape. For example, in the mid-1990s, the IRS established a new Chief Information Officer (CIO) position and a new IS Directives Management (DM) section that today produces eight confusing and overlapping types of directives including:
• Policy Statements ("to convey the [information] policy of the IRS");
• Delegation of Authority ("to vest authority at the point where immediate responsibility has been placed"); • CIO Memorandums ("to communicate high-level direction or guidance");
• Internal Revenue Manuals ("to provide clear direction to the organization");
• Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) Handbooks ("to provide a step-by-step procedure, within a process, to produce a product that meets a standard"); • Interim Directives ("in situations where a brief temporary instruction is needed before the IRM or IRM Handbook can clear the impacted area"); • Standards ("to adopt one option from a multitude of potentially conflicting alternatives"); • Law Enforcement Manuals ("to provide information relating to enforcement of tactics, methods, procedures, or other criteria").
The CIO and DM staff members also created a complex process to control the production of all these computer-related directives that further burdened the organization with red tape (IRS, 1999) . Finally, new ICT technologies also increase the complexity of the mound. For example, DOD officials discovered that they could consolidate mainframe operations but that they could do little to streamline distributed computing networks (GAO, 1997d) . Likewise, the IRS recently created a new system to collect tax returns filed electronically. Data was then "drained from disk to tape" and transferred to the old legacy systems for processing (IRS, 2000c) .
BLACK-BOXING: WHAT DO ELECTRONIC MOUNDS KNOW?
Electronic mounds grow because organizations refuse to forget (i.e., they refuse to purge data from databases). Often, organizations must first forget certain past episodes to make room for new learning experiences (Dery, 1998, p. 686; Starbuck, 1996) . Regrettably, databases cannot forget on their own. Hence, humans must choose what databases should forget. Profit considerations help private sector corporations decide which data to remember or forget (i.e., retain more data about clients than about prospects). However, asking bureaucrats to purge data is like asking them to decide in advance what questions they will not be able to answer.
By opting to remember everything, bureaucrats provide for the unchecked growth of the electronic mound. Over time, the mound accumulates "data cemeteries" (i.e., poor data that can no longer be verified and corrected) (Lenk, 1994, p. 308 However, the cost of granting a new immigrant an "absorption benefits package" twice (due to a fraudulent claim) is miniscule in comparison to the cost of upgrading the Ministry's systems so they can retain massive amounts of old data. Still, the Ministry refuses to forget, and in 1991, the Ministry's PMIS department devoured almost 9% of the entire ministerial budget. Typically, a PMIS department consumes 3% to 4% of the organization's budget. In another example, after the saving and loans debacle, Congress passed the federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act (1992) and established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) as an independent regulator. Congress instructed OFHEO to develop stress tests to assess the soundness of the $1.5 trillion financial obligations of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). This task could have been completed successfully by running off-the-shelf financial software packages against data samples. Instead, OFHEO staff members decided first to convert all of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's huge data files to a common data format and drove their project into the ground because they could not successfully complete this monumental conversion project (GAO, 1997e) .
Data cemeteries also evolve as the mound begins to generate data on its own. Consider the case of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). In 1995, DOE developed a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program that uses various computer simulation techniques to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons. To implement this program, the agency in 1998 already possessed about 17% of the world's supercomputing capacity. However, nuclear simulations created huge stocks of data that had to be saved, restored, backed up, and communicated across wide area networks. In DOE's Livermore laboratory, for example, the wide area network was 100 to 300 times too small to support these tasks (GAO, 1998e) .
In addition to data cemeteries, the electronic mound accumulates massive amounts of rules and exceptions to the rule. Bureaucrats algorithmize "special treatments" for "special populations" and inscribe these algorithms into the mound. The organization as a whole then succumbs to the tyranny of software-coded rules. Y2K tormented public organizations precisely because so many special treatments for special cases were-and remain-coded in software. No single human mind can be held accountable for the accumulation of 25.6 million lines of software code aboard a space shuttle, the FAA's 23 million lines of computer code, or the SSA's 35 million lines of in-house software code (Forester & Morrison, 1994, pp. 121-122; GAO, 2000b) . However, when the number of inscribed rules increases linearly, the interrelations among inscriptions grow exponentially, and the mound's internal entropy grows unchecked (Brooks, 1995, p. 250) .
But computers prevent the bureaucratic mind from noticing this evolving entropy. Invisibly, computers accumulate numerous, poorly designed rules. For example, in 1989, officials in the Israeli Ministry of Finance (MOF) hired a consultant to improve the poor process that guided the launching of new governmental ICT projects. He vowed to create guidelines that would "make the [software making] rules simpler and shorter." The consultant's first manual (dubbed MAFTEACH) was 150 pages long and contained good advice on how to think through the pros and cons of new software projects. In 1991, the cabinet decreed that all new governmental software projects must comply with MAFTEACH guidelines. In 1994, version 4 of MAFTEACH was shipped on four computer diskettes, and the latest MAFTEACH (version 5.2, released in 1999) is already a full-fledged HTML software product containing guidelines on topics such as ICT outsourcing and ISO 9000 quality standards. A hard copy of all these guidelines spans eight thick volumes of regulations, guidelines, templates, dictionaries, and documents. Today, Israeli PMIS managers hire full-time employees and consultants to comply with all of these rules. Asked how a simple 150-page manual grew into eight thick volumes, MAFTEACH's creator replied, "But it does not matter. Look, it is all in hypertext and you can easily browse [the eight volumes] with a few mouse clicks."
NAVIGATING: HOW DO ELECTRONIC MOUNDS SPEAK?
The electronic mound speaks through infocrats. Infocrats are employees who intimately work with-and therefore understand-the mound. Scholars often focus on technocrats who gain power by translating business requirements into technical agendas (Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995; Boston, 1994; Brint, 1990; Burris, 1993; Fordham, 1990; Saint-Martin, 1998; Zuurmond, 1994, pp. 203-204) . However, much less has been written on how infocrats gain power by commanding the navigation paths to critical information buried in the mound. This section explores how infocrats become the voice of the electronic mound.
Work tends to drift from the desks of the many to the desks of the talented "knowledge-worker" minority. Overburdened knowledge workers frequently ask lowly PMIS employees to write software programs to produce a routine report. Over many years, the PMIS department acquires a large stock of such programs. In this way, business reports become "technical jobs." A PMIS employee assumes responsibility for "running the job," a common MIS expression. When the "job breaks," the PMIS employee investigates the failure by exploring the mound. Virtually always, the PMIS employee discovers that someone somewhere made a business decision that resulted in "minor changes" to one or more data variables. These variables then traveled through various data feeds across several systems before failing the routine job. By virtue of many similar investigations, the PMIS employee becomes an infocrat. The employee now commands exclusive techno-business knowledge that permits him or her to quickly find the critical obligatory passage paths through which data travels in the mound. Infocrats are then invited to attend business meetings and explain to other employees the "invisible logic" of the mound (Alic, 1990, pp. 301, 316) . In these meetings, infocrats Peled / DO COMPUTERS CUT RED TAPE? 423 speak on behalf of an inflexible electronic mound that will take jobs only in certain data formats and through the appropriate communications protocols.
Ironically, infocrats in large organizations worldwide successfully tackled the Y2K challenge because the millennium bug was just the kind of computing problem that they intimately understand. They easily found the obligatory passage points (data variables of DATE type) and then applied tools to fix the mound, system by system, one line of software code after the other. By doing so, infocrats resolved the Y2K problem and, at the same time, ensured that the electronic mound would survive as is for years to come. If, on the other hand, they had tried to "rationalize" the mound (i.e., retire old systems) to prepare it for Y2K, they would have been less successful because it is virtually impossible to retire simultaneously numerous mission-critical systems. The Y2K incident serves as a powerful reminder that infocrats are not merely the passive voices of the electronic mound. Infocrats also prescribe and implement specific technical solutions that contribute to the unchecked growth of the mound, and they are the only ones able to access its vital information.
HOW DO ELECTRONIC MOUNDS GENERATE RED TAPE?
Silently and unarguably, organizational balance sheets document the cost of the new electronic red tape. Today, between 50% and 75% of all ICT budgets are dedicated to operations and maintenance (Integris Group, 1999) . Often, technology enforces new types of red tape to abolish older forms of red tape. For example, about 20 Dutch social security organizations created RINIS, a broker institute that standardizes data definitions so one agency can retrieve data from another. RINIS eliminated red tape in the sense that citizens no longer needed to fill out the same form twice for two different agencies. However, the various Dutch social security organizations created an elaborate mechanism to ensure that certain agencies acquire monopolies over certain types of data. For example, all RINIS organizations can collect personal income data from citizens but the only "authoritative" personal income data is that collected by the Dutch tax authorities. Dutch citizens have less red tape to comply with, but bureaucrats have more (Bekkers & Zouridis, 1999, pp. 188, 191; Zuurmond, 1994, pp. 203-204) . Electronic red tape resembles energy in the first law of thermodynamics-one cannot destroy it; rather, organizations merely transform red tape from one form into another.
Legislatures are also partially responsible for the unchecked growth of new electronic red tape. For example, frequent congressional changes in Medicare and Medicaid billing rules have increased the complexity and scope of the electronic mound of the Department of Health and Human Service's Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and hospitals, where about 40% of all billings are Medicare or Medicaid related. Programmers devote thousands of hours each year to keeping their patient billing systems up to date. One hospital official described this expensive ritual as "chasing a moving target" (GAO, 1996b) . Likewise, the electronic mound of the Federal Reserve Bank and individual banks grew considerably when Congress passed the Truth in Savings Act (Regulation DD), which forced individual banks to list every fee charged to a customer's account separately on his or her statement (GAO, 1996b) .
When papereality-"a world of symbols, or written representations, that takes precedence over the things and events represented" (see Dery, 1998 )-becomes digital, the organization will no longer benefit from "creative destruction" opportunities (i.e., when a disaster erases the organizational memory, thus compelling its members to think about old routines in new ways). Today, when disaster strikes, organizations are expected to "bootstrap" themselves from remotely stored electronic backup sets, to restore immediately every data element and software-coded rule, and to reinstate the same inertia-driven world that existed before. A veteran Israeli ICT consultant said, "It is far easier to create a new bank than to make sense out of the information systems of an old bank."
The electronic mound also imposes "an unyielding set of [new] obligations and prohibitions" on its users (Kaufman, 1977, p. 99) . Here, one must carefully separate old problems from new, computer-related ones. For example, the Israeli Budget Ordinances book (TAKAM) contains computer-related regulations that are reminiscent of older regulations. Some are useful (i.e., "The login name for each user will include first name plus first two letters of the family name."). Others are tie-breaking rules (i.e., "In case of common names like Cohen or Levy, the login name will include a third character that is not included in the family name."). Several rules state the obvious (i.e., "E-mail address names will not include insults and profanity."). A few are ridiculous (i.e., "Bureaucrats are obliged to answer every e-mail within two weeks."). Why are e-mails different from older types of citizen communications such as letters and faxes, many of which remain unanswered? (TAKAM Budget Ordinances Book, Classification 1-05.03.04.00.00). Indeed, the operation of computer networks propels organizations to generate more of the same red tape.
However, data security, external hackers, and viruses are new types of problems that generate confusion, which, in turn, generates new types of red tape. The GAO published 60 major reports on data security themes between September 1996 and September 1998 (as cited in GAO, 1998f). Every time a major global computer virus strikes, the GAO publishes new rules about how to tighten data security (GAO, 1999e, 2000c . In a recent incident, GAO staff members criticized security administrators at the Hines benefits delivery center of the Veteran Health Administration (VHA) for performing "fewer than 60 of about 4,800 actions to administer security during a particular period" (GAO, 1999f). One cannot help but wonder how a single service delivery center can be reasonably expected to fulfill 4,800 data security tasks and how many of these tasks are really necessary. The GAO admitted that the "proliferation of organizations with overlapping [data security] oversight responsibilities" created confusion because federal bureaucrats do not know which data security rules to follow. The GAO then asked the Congress to resolve this confusion (GAO, 1999g) . Congress will now create additional tiebreaking rules to clarify data security responsibilities.
Public organizations today are also compelled to generate numerous new rules to address the "browsing" problem (i.e., the unauthorized electronic access into computerized records of citizens). The IRS, for example, added three new antibrowsing systems to its electronic mound. First, IRS officials created the Electronic Audit Research Log (EARL) system to register every employee's online activity. But EARL could not distinguish between legitimate and unauthorized browsing activity. So, the IRS created a new system to separate legitimate and unauthorized access, but it too registered only IDRS-related browsing activities rather than browsing activities in other IRS systems. The IRS is already at work to produce yet a third antibrowsing system (GAO, 1997f, 1998g) . This example illustrates how the electronic mound creates new computer-related problems that, in turn, compel organizations to inscribe new systems into the mound.
Public organizations today must also create guidelines on how to use new computing technologies. Often, these technologies become obsolete before the guidelines are published, as exemplified by DOD's attempt to enforce the use of its Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET), despite the evolution of newer, cheaper, better, and simpler e-commerce solutions (GAO, 1997g) . In addition, public organizations must establish new rules to tackle emerging domains such as telemedicine (i.e., the provision of health care via online means) (GAO, 1997h Table 1 presents the themes associated with each of the three key concepts (mounding, black-boxing, and navigating) discussed in the article.
The computers-as-actors theory explains why large organizations, which adopted computing in the early 1960s, today have electronic mounds that inhibit flexibility, innovation, and reform. We can use this theory to explain why large and older organizations suffer from higher levels of red tape than do their smaller and newer counterparts (Bretschneider, 1990; Bretschneider & Wittmer, 1993; Moon, 1999; Rainey, Pandey, & Bozeman, 1995) . The theory also suggests that a cyclical relationship exists between computers and red tape. Organizations purchase computers that often generate their own red tape, which, in turn, increases the demand to 426 ARPA / December 2001 further computerize operations (Brudney & Selden, 1995, pp. 82-83; Pandey & Bretschneider, 1997) .
There is no "silver-bullet" solution for the problems caused by the electronic mound. Nonetheless, the organization can adopt three strategies to improve the situation. To address the problem of mounding, senior managers must steer away from technological fashions that do not provide concrete benefits for the organization. To do so, they must ask simple questions before approving new computer development programs such as: What computer systems does the organization already own? How do the existing systems depend on each other? Managers can also celebrate small-scale achievements such as the successful integration of two computer systems into a single system. Wherever and whenever possible, managers must seek "low computing" solutions (i.e., solutions that do not require the introduction of new computer technology) for organizational problems. Recently, several large public organizations have begun to adopt this course of action. For example, the FAA now subscribes to the "build a little, test a little" approach instead of its former "modernize everything" approach. Today, FAA programmers limit the scope of their development efforts and deploy technologies prior to their full Peled / DO COMPUTERS CUT RED TAPE? 427 Extending the lives of old computer systems to support newer ones. Immortalizing the lives of older technologies because they are more reliable than newer ones. Inscribing "interim solutions" in old systems to meet pressing organizational needs. Engraving new computing layers onto the electronic mound in accordance with management fads (i.e., outsourcing). Fostering codependencies across organizational electronic mounds. Black-boxing: Inscribing complex organizational behavior, old data, and "special case" rules into computer systems. Inscribing computerized routines and data variables that cannot be changed later on. Remembering every historical detail and the cost associated with this refusal to forget. Nurturing "data cemeteries" that contain nonverifiable and inaccurate historical records. Accumulating rules and exceptions to the rule that algorithmize "special treatment" for "special populations." Bootstrapping the organizational memory from massive electronic backup sets and the loss of "creative destruction" opportunities. Failing to convert the massive amounts of historical data from one format to another. Navigating: Retrieving information from the electronic mound.
Cultivating a new class of infocrats-a handful of employees who command a rare mix of business acumen and technical expertise. Transferring critical business knowledge from business units to the Management of Information Systems (MIS) department. Subjecting new organizational routines to the requirements of an inflexible electronic mound. Solving only the problems that infocrats understand (i.e., Y2K) rather than the more important nontechnical problems (i.e., computer modernization programs). Creating new "obligatory passage points" (i.e., burdensome electronic routines to tackle new computer problems such as hackers, viruses, and unauthorized browsing).
maturity to provide immediate incremental improvements. Even the GAO, a traditional champion of "begin-from-scratch" modernization projects, has praised this new approach that modestly and wisely aims to satisfy the FAA's computer needs rather than rationalize them (GAO, 1998h) .
To tackle the black-boxing problem, senior managers can adopt an incremental cleanup strategy. For example, they can dedicate a certain percentage of their financial and manpower resources to eradicating records from data cemeteries and to obliterating special case rules. Senior managers can also demand that every computer project progress report include lists of obsolete software-coded rules and data records that were discovered by accident and successfully purged (i.e., today no one in the organization has an incentive to purge them). Organizations can also keep a published and running tally of computer-related chores such as fighting viruses and hackers. Senior managers must also be actively involved in computer/database design meetings to curtail the enthusiasm of their technical employees to buy the "latest and greatest" computer technology.
Finally, to address the navigating problem, organizations can adopt the "execution path" strategy that compels managers to command the execution path of each of their automated business reports. According to this strategy, midlevel managers-not infocrats-will be required to understand which data elements each of the different organizational computer systems contributes to a given business report, how these data elements travel among systems inside the electronic mound, and how report columns are calculated and summarized. The burdensome routines that are buried deep inside the electronic mound will be exposed and dealt with only in organizations where a large number of nontechnical employees can describe such routines. Organizations can nurture an environment that helps employees understand these routines. For example, organizations can pair together technical and nontechnical employees to jointly own a given automated business report. Organizations can also develop charting standards to describe the execution paths of batched business reports and encourage meetings among teams in which one team will use these standards to describe the execution paths of its business reports to other teams. The aggregate result of all of these small and incremental steps would be to expose the mound's internal routines so senior managers could later prioritize what to fix and what not to fix. Above all, organizations must remember that for all its complexity, the electronic mound remains the living carrier of the organization's memories and needs, past and present. There will be no future for organizations that fail to coexist with their electronic past. 
APPENDIX A Computer Projects Cited

